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The experience of agency, i.e., the registration that I am the initiator of my actions, is
a basic and constant underpinning of our interaction with the world. Whereas several
accounts have underlined predictive processes as the central mechanism (e.g., the
comparator model by C. Frith), others emphasized postdictive inferences (e.g., post-hoc
inference account by D. Wegner). Based on increasing evidence that both predictive and
postdictive processes contribute to the experience of agency, we here present a unifying
but at the same time parsimonious approach that reconciles these accounts: predictive
and postdictive processes are both integrated by the brain according to the principles of
optimal cue integration. According to this framework, predictive and postdictive processes
each serve as authorship cues that are continuously integrated and weighted depending
on their availability and reliability in a given situation. Both sensorimotor and cognitive
signals can serve as predictive cues (e.g., internal predictions based on an efferency
copy of the motor command or cognitive anticipations based on priming). Similarly, other
sensorimotor and cognitive cues can each serve as post-hoc cues (e.g., visual feedback
of the action or the affective valence of the action outcome). Integration and weighting
of these cues might not only differ between contexts and individuals, but also between
different subject and disease groups. For example, schizophrenia patients with delusions
of influence seem to rely less on (probably imprecise) predictivemotor signals of the action
and more on post-hoc action cues like e.g., visual feedback and, possibly, the affective
valence of the action outcome. Thus, the framework of optimal cue integration offers
a promising approach that directly stimulates a wide range of experimentally testable
hypotheses on agency processing in different subject groups.
Keywords: agency, schizophrenia, delusions of influence, control, internal model, efference copy, comparator
model, optimal cue integration
INTRODUCTION
The experience of agency, i.e., the registration that I am the
initiator of my actions, is a basic and constant underpinning
of our interaction with the world: whenever we grasp, type, or
walk, we register the resulting sensory consequences as caused
by ourselves. In the last two decades, several different accounts
have been proposed to explain the neurocognitive underpin-
nings of this experience. While some accounts put a stronger
emphasis on processes preceding the execution of one’s respec-
tive action for installing an experience of agency, others more
strongly emphasize processes succeeding one’s action. According
to this emphasis (which is, of course, not to be seen as an
absolute dichotomy, but rather as two poles on a continuous spec-
trum), these accounts can be grouped in predictive and postdictive
accounts.
Here we discuss the short-comings of either type of account
(if seen in isolation) and propose a framework of the experience
of agency that will combine both accounts and stimulate man-
ifold experimentally testable hypotheses. This will be illustrated
by the example of impaired agency processing in schizophrenia
patients suffering from delusions of control. The framework pre-
sented here elaborates on and specifies several recent studies that
have likewise investigated and proposed mechanisms of an “inte-
gration model of agency” (Wegner and Sparrow, 2004; Bayne and
Pacherie, 2007; Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Moore et al., 2009a,b;
Moore and Fletcher, 2012). However, in contrast to these earlier
studies, this framework brings in a new perspective by starting
off from an analysis of predictive vs. postdictive accounts, by
focussing not only on delusions of control but rather the expe-
rience of agency in general [in contrast to e.g., Fletcher and Frith
(2009)] and by integrating also very recent results on both pre-
dictive processes (e.g., Desantis et al., 2012; Hughes et al., 2013)
and post-hoc processes. Moreover, it proposes a novel scheme
how and on which level different agency cues might be integrated
(Figure 1). Finally, we describe the affective valence of an action
outcome as a relatively novel self-agency cue, which has not been
considered in the original predictive and postdictive accounts and
which might explain why delusions of control in schizophrenia
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FIGURE 1 | Proposed account of optimal cue integration underlying the
experience of agency. The sense of agency arises from a complex interplay
between a predictive component on the one hand and a postdictive
component on the other hand. On a sensorimotor level, the predictive
component comprises of “sensorimotor priors”: internal cues such as motor
predictions (computed in a forward model), action selection, and motor
output signals as well as an efference copy of the motor command.
Depending on the context and the environment, these internal signals can
directly lead to a feeling of agency which only arises due to internal motor
command signals. On other occasions, predictions are compared to or
integrated with external cues such as sensory input, resulting in a postdictive
feeling of agency. A low-level, prereflective feeling of agency can lead to a
more explicit judgement of agency on the cognitive level. Here, background
information about the environment, internal knowledge about the world or
background beliefs have a strong influence on agency judgement.
Judgements as well as background beliefs and contextual information in turn
can change priors on the sensorimotor level. Furthermore, emotional
appraisal, anticipation of reward or punishment or value attribution may
influence the weighing of internal or external signals on both the
sensorimotor and cognitive level.
patients rarely refer to trivial, non-emotional actions, but rather
to very specific actions with high affective and moral value.
POSTDICTIVE vs. PREDICTIVE ACCOUNTS OF AGENCY
An example for an influential account of postdictive agency
processing is Daniel Wegner’s famous account (Wegner, 2002,
2003)1. Here, the experience of agency is mainly seen as the
product of a fallible post-hoc inference during and after the
action has occurred, rather than as the result of an infallible
direct access to one’s cognitive and motor preparation processes
preceding one’s action. According to this notion, the experience
of agency for a particular event comes in degrees: it is most
strongly, (1) when one’s action is the exclusive potential cause
of the event (exclusivity), (2) when one has prior thoughts or
plans about the action (priority), and (3) when the occurred
1For the following summary of these accounts, we were inspired by
the nice overview and comparison given at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Inferring_self-agency (Accessed 08/11/2012).
action matches the action that was planned (consistency). Based
on these three criteria, an inference of self-agency is constructed
after the event has taken place, namely by postdictive inference.
In this account, low-level motor mechanisms directly related to
the motor command and the execution of the action play only a
minor role for this inference. Rather, cognitive priors and antici-
pations, background thoughts, and intention-outcome matching
processes (unrelated to very specific and fine-grained character-
istics of the actual motor command and the actually executed
action) assume a critical role for inferring self-agency. Thus, many
inferential accounts—from bothWegner and other authors—also
integrate some predictive mechanisms, as they also regard move-
ment priors as important cues for experiencing agency [see e.g.,
Linser and Goschke (2007)]. However, the experience of agency
is nevertheless still essentially seen as the inferential product of a
fallible post-hoc inference which integrates, inter alia, also cogni-
tive and motor priors. It is not seen as the result of an infallible
direct access to one’s motor preparation processes preceding one’s
action.
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On the other end of the spectrum, accounts elaborating on
computational models of sensorimotor integration (Sperry, 1950;
von Holst and Mittelstaedt, 1950; von Holst, 1954; Wolpert et al.,
1995) hypothesize that the experience of agency for a given action
essentially arises from internal motor representations associated
with generating the movement that precede the action. For exam-
ple, according to the renowned comparator model (Frith et al.,
2000; Blakemore et al., 2002), an internal prediction about the
sensory consequences of one’s actions is generated on the basis
of an efference copy of the motor command. These predicted
sensory consequences can be compared with the actual sensory
state after that action has been initiated. If the actual sensory state
matches the predicted one, it is registered as self-caused. In case of
a mismatch, it is registered as externally caused. Although, strictly
speaking, this account is also not a purely predictive account of
agency—as agency registration here requires the sensory feedback
of one’s action (and thus also a “postdictive” component) for the
comparison process—, the predictive mechanism here plays the
critical role. The sensory feedback is only required for compari-
son purposes and does not per se carry the critical information
for installing an experience of agency. Thus, in contrast to the
inferential accounts of agency, the main emphasis here is not on
postdictive inferences but on predictive sensorimotor processes.
PREDICTIVE AND POSTDICTIVE ACCOUNTS EACH HAVE
MAJOR LIMITATIONS
Within the sense of agency, two levels have to be distinguished: the
feeling of agency, which consists of a non-conceptual, automatic
registration of whether I am the agent or not, and the judgment of
agency, which is the formation of a belief about who the initiator
of the movement was [Synofzik et al., 2008a,b; for a partly differ-
ent distinction between two levels within the sense of agency see
Bayne and Pacherie (2007)]. The automatic registration on the
level of feeling can lead to the perception of a particular action or
sensory event as self-caused. Subsequently and based on this feel-
ing, a judgment might be established (depending on the demands
of the context), which takes into account not only the feeling itself
but also context information, background beliefs, general social
norms, etc.
Both the predictive and the postdictive accounts have difficul-
ties because they do not respect this distinction. For example, the
predictive account based on internal predictions about the sen-
sory consequences of one’s movements model might explain the
basic, non-conceptual feeling of agency; but it cannot explain the
actual conceptual attribution of an action to one’s own or some-
body else’s agency, i.e., the judgement of agency (Synofzik et al.,
2008b). This attribution does not depend only on sensorimotor
processes, but requires integration of context cues, background
beliefs, and post-hoc inferences (Synofzik et al., 2008b). In turn,
Wegner’s postdictive account and many studies supporting this
account seem to focus mainly on conscious conceptual judge-
ments of agency. These judgements might indeed essentially build
on post-hoc inferences based on complex cognitive cues such
as prior expectations about the task, background beliefs, social
interaction, and context estimations. Nevertheless, this postdic-
tive account cannot give an explanation of the feeling-level of
agency.
Moreover, Wegner’s postdictive account of agency is con-
fronted with several further challenges and biological or explana-
tory disadvantages:
1. The experience of agency would arise only very late in the
action process. This would result from the fact that it was
necessarily reconstructed only after the action (or the event)
has occurred. Feedback and cognitive inference mechanisms
are known to take long, at least when compared to predic-
tive processes. Such delays would lead to severe failures of
sensorimotor systems that need to continuously distinguish
whether a sensory event within the ongoing incoming sen-
sory flow is self-caused or not. Even a tiny delay in this
process would lead to the perception of the visual environ-
ment as instable (Haarmeier et al., 2001; Lindner et al., 2005)
or to distracting haptic feedback when interacting with the
world (Blakemore et al., 1999).
2. The experience of agency would be a very fallible and error-
prone process. Directly accessible internal motor represen-
tations usually present a highly robust and reliable internal
action information source. In Wegener’s account, however,
these motor representations play only a minor role; instead,
subjects rather rely on the action context and outcome.
Accordingly, the experience of agency would be at constant
risk of being misled by ad-hoc events and distorting fac-
tors in the environment, absent or noisy action feedback,
misguided background beliefs, and confusing emotions and
evaluations.
3. The information necessary for the experience of agency
would not be part of the sensorimotor processing of the
action itself. It would be rather added to the perception of
an action by a post-hoc inferential cognitive process.
4. This process seems to function on a conceptual level, thus
requiring conceptual capacities. However, even relatively
simple non-human animals which probably do not have
conceptual capacities—like e.g., crickets—are able to distin-
guish self-produced sensory events from externally produced
events (Poulet and Hedwig, 2002, 2006). Thus, this account
cannot explain the self/non-self-distinction in these sys-
tems, and puts high demands on an explanation of how
the experience of agency has phylo- and ontogenetically
evolved2.
But also the Frith’ian predictive account of agency faces several
further challenges and biological or explanatory disadvantages
(Synofzik et al., 2008b; Vosgerau and Synofzik, 2012):
1. The output of the comparator model is not only insuffi-
cient to explain judgements of agency. In some instances, it
2The self-external distinction which also occurs in simple animals and during
many continuous sensorimotor operations in humans should, of course, not
be equated with the experience of agency, but is only a necessary (yet not suf-
ficient) condition for this experience. This distinction might build the basis
and trigger an experience of agency, but is, in itself, only a very basic, mostly
non-conscious registration of a low-level registration system (Vosgerau and
Newen, 2007; Synofzik et al., 2008a).
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can also not fully explain the direct non-conceptual percep-
tion of one’s actions. A recent study by Wilke and colleagues
shows that the perception of one’s actions is—in addition
to the comparison between internal predictions and sensory
feedback—also modulated by external cues presented post-
hoc (here: the affective valence of action outcomes) (Wilke
et al., 2012).
2. A comparator processing might, at least in some instances,
not even be necessary for the experience of agency. For
example, in a “helping hands” pantomime task, subjects
experienced high degrees of agency for movements that were
performed by another agent, when the other agent’s hands
appeared in the place where subjects’hands would normally
appear and when subjects could hear instructions preview-
ing each movement (Wegner et al., 2004). Since subjects’
own arms remained passive, there was most plausibly no
efference copy tied to one’s motor command that could be
used for a specific and detailed prediction about the upcom-
ing event (but, if at all, only a general cognitive anticipatory
or intentional state). This finding demonstrates that internal
predictions (which are only issued in case of active move-
ments) are not necessary to induce an experience of agency,
but external cues (here: externally provided prior instruc-
tions) can substitute it. In fact, this particular finding is
rather in line with a postdictive inferential account of agency.
3. The comparator model account might explain some
instances of the experience of agency, but needs various
adjustments for many other instances (Carruthers, 2012;
Vosgerau and Synofzik, 2012). For example, with respect to
priming studies, “the amount of modification to the [com-
parator] model needed is becoming incredibly large and
none of these modifications is predicted by the initial [com-
parator] model” (Carruthers, 2012, p. 43). Thus, it not only
remains questionable whether it is indeed possible to inte-
grate all different adjustments into a coherently adjusted
comparator model; the comparator model does also not
specify a number of problems, thus making various different
adjustments possible and necessary, which cannot be extrap-
olated from the comparator model itself anymore (Vosgerau
and Synofzik, 2012).
OPTIMAL CUE INTEGRATION: COMBINING PREDICTIVE AND
POSTDICTIVE AGENCY CUES
If evaluated in separation, both the predictive and the postdic-
tive account face severe challenges and limitations. And, indeed,
there is increasing evidence that the experience of agency does
not result from either predictive or postdictive processes, but that
both types of processes contribute to the experience of agency,
and that they do so in a closely interacting way. For example,
Kühn and colleagues suggested that agency judgements incor-
porate early information processing components (based on the
finding that agency judgements were predictable already by the
P3a component of tone event-related potentials), and are not
purely reconstructive, post-hoc evaluations generated only at time
of judgement (Kuhn et al., 2011). In turn, asmentioned above, the
perception of one’s actions is not fully determined by predictive
motor processes, but also modulated by external cues presented
post-hoc, like e.g., the affective valence of the action outcome
(Wilke et al., 2012).
But howmight the brain integrate predictive and post-hoc cues
to form a valid and reliable experience of agency for a given
sensory event in a particular situation? A proposal of optimal
cue integration has recently emerged: the brain constantly inte-
grates several different authorship cues and weights each cue
according to its relative reliability in a given situation (Synofzik
et al., 2009, 2010; Synofzik and Voss, 2010). The reliability of
a cue would be low if its variance is high; in turn, its reliabil-
ity would be high if it is present in a very salient way and/or
highly precise. This notion follows the framework of optimal cue
integration established in the field of object perception: accord-
ing to this framework, no single information signal is powerful
enough to convey an adequate representation of a certain percep-
tual entity under all everyday conditions. Instead, depending on
the availability and reliability of a certain information cue, dif-
ferent combination and integration strategies should be used to
frame the weighting of sensory and motor signals. Usually, pre-
dictive efferent signals such as internal predictions serve as the
most reliable and robust agency cues, as they usually provide
the fastest and least noisy information about one’s own actions
(Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001). However, in some situations and
subjects, other cues might outweigh or even replace these effer-
ent signals to install a basic registration of agency. For example,
if predictive cues like internal predictions are weak or impre-
cise, post-hoc cues like the action feedback or the action outcome
should receive a higher weight for determining one’s experience
of agency. In other words: the variance within one agency cue
should be directly related to the reliance on another. Thus, opti-
mal cue integration might not only allow robust perception of
objects and the world (Ernst and Banks, 2002; Ernst and Bulthoff,
2004) and efficient sensorimotor learning (Kording and Wolpert,
2004), it could also provide the basis for subjects’ robust, and
at the same time flexible, agency experience in variable con-
texts (Synofzik et al., 2009; Synofzik and Voss, 2010; Moore and
Fletcher, 2012).
Predictive cues entering the cue integration process are in a
sensorimotor format and can consist of e.g., an efference copy,
internal predictions based on an efferency copy of the motor com-
mand (Frith et al., 2000) or sensorimotor predictions based on
automatic associations [e.g., through subliminal priming prim-
ing (Wegner, 2003; Wegner et al., 2004; Aarts et al., 2005)].
We refer to these different predictive components as “senso-
rimotor priors” (see Figure 1). Some sensorimotor priors can
also be influenced by cognitive cues like background beliefs or
knowledge about the world [e.g., motor processing or sensorimo-
tor predictions can by influenced by autosuggestion or through
supraliminal priming (Wegner et al., 2004; Aarts et al., 2005)
or through prior causal beliefs induced by contextual informa-
tion (Desantis et al., 2011)] (see Figure 1). Also the postdictive
component can contain sensorimotor cues, e.g., the visual feed-
back of the action (Synofzik et al., 2010) or feedback in other
sensory modalities (including proprioception). Both predictive
and postdictive components can contribute to the feeling of
agency, which operates on a non-conceptual sensorimotor level
(see Figure 1).
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On the conceptual cognitive level, a judgement of agency is
formed. This is largely based on the feeling of agency, but also
takes into account cognitive cues like background beliefs and
information about the environment [e.g., the post-hoc observa-
tion that I am the only person in the room (cf. de Vignemont
and Fourneret, 2004)]. At both levels—the level of feeling and
the level of judgement of agency—the cue integration process can
be modulated by affective components (e.g., affective valence of
the action outcome [Wilke et al., 2012] (see Figure 1)). The con-
text and the environment have a direct influence on the weighting
of postdictive sensorimotor cues (e.g., lighting conditions on the
reliability of vision), and a more indirect influence on the forma-
tion of the judgment of agency via cognitive representations of
the environment (see Figure 1).
If understood in this way, optimal cue integration provides a
unified framework to explain many findings from recent studies
of agency, such as priming studies. For example, in the abovemen-
tioned study by Moore et al. (2009a), which combines intentional
binding and priming, passive movements can be seen as an
instance where internal predictions are not available for the sys-
tem. The optimal cue integration approach would now predict
that external cues (e.g., primes) should receive a higher weight
for determining the experience of agency. This is exactly what the
authors observed: primes modulated perceived intervals for both
active and passive movements, but the modulation was greatest
for passive movements (Moore et al., 2009a; Synofzik et al., 2009).
This finding, however, has to be interpreted with caution
as—in contrast to a long-standing assumption—intentional
binding (present in the active condition) does not necessarily
reflect a signature of agency. As we have argued earlier (Synofzik
et al., 2009), the fact that perceived time intervals between move-
ment and effect were decreased by priming also in case of involun-
tary movements opens up the possibility that the binding between
movement and effect might not be specific to agency and inten-
tionality, but can also present—at least in part—amore unspecific
effect linked to temporal binding between two events (in this
case between the two congruent sounds, i.e., between prime and
effect). Indeed, recent studies suggest that intentional binding is
neither linked specifically to motor predictive processes (Desantis
et al., 2012; Hughes et al., 2013) nor to agency (Buehner and
Humphreys, 2009; Buehner, 2012; Dogge et al., 2012), but rather
to causality in general. However, even if the phenomenon of bind-
ing of movements to their effects was not due to motor predictive
processes, it could still contribute to the experience of agency,
for instance, by accentuating subject’s perception of the temporal
contiguity between movements and their effects (Desantis et al.,
2012). Since this accentuation would probably be higher for active
than for passive movements, it might also serve as a stronger
agency cue in active than in passive movements. Correspondingly,
the optimal cue integration approach would predict that subjects’
experience of agency would bemore open tomodulation by exter-
nal primes in the passive condition than in the active condition.
This interpretation would still be compatible with the findings by
Moore et al. (2009a).
If internal predictions do not allow to predict the effect of an
action—e.g., because of a low contingency between action and
effect—, the optimal cue approach would predict that other cues
(e.g., primes) should be given more weight for the registration of
agency. These additional cues, however, should not receive par-
ticular weight if internal predictions serve as a sufficiently reliable
predictor for an upcoming event.
This hypothesis was investigated by Gentsch et al. (2012).
Subjects had to press a key, which was followed by a certain
visual outcome on a computer screen (arrows pointing up or
down) with high (75%) or low (50%) contingency, and which
was preceded by a congruent or incongruent prime. In case of
high contingency, subjects could reliably predict the visual out-
come (arrow pointing up or down), and they should not need to
rely on the prime. In case of low contingency, however, they could
not do so; here they should rely also on the prime. This is exactly
what the authors observed: in the low contingency condition, but
not in the high contingency condition, priming had an effect on
the judgement of the causal strength between action and effect.
However, this effect was not found on the level of the cortical N1
response to actively generated feedback, which the authors take
as a measure for the feeling of agency. Here priming influenced
the response independent of the contingency between action and
effect. However, the cortical N1 response might not be a measure
of the feeling of agency [as suggested by the authors (Gentsch
et al., 2012)], but only of one of the cues—in this case a senso-
rimotor prediction based on priming as opposed to the motor
prediction based on implicit learning of contingencies. On this
interpretation, the sensorimotor prediction would be weighted
high if no motor predictions are present (low-contingency) and
low if motor predictions are present (high-contingency).
INTEGRATION OF PREDICTIVE AND post-hoc CUES IN
SCHIZOPHRENIA PATIENTS
Schizophrenia patients suffering from delusions of influence can
be seen as “pathophysiology model” for agency processing, i.e.,
they provide a window to the processes underlying one’s self-
attribution of actions. In particular, they illustrate how predictive
and post-hoc cues of agency are both integrated according to the
principles of cue integration (Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Synofzik
et al., 2010).
Schizophrenia patients with delusions of influence feel that
their actions are no longer controlled by themselves. Sometimes
they not only experience their actions as not self-caused, lead-
ing only to a vague and strange experience, but also attribute
them to some specific other agents (e.g., to a friend, neigh-
bor, or the devil) (Frith, 1992). How can this experience be
explained by the optimal cue integration approach? Although
several studies that argue for a close link between delusions of
influence and a deficit in internal motor predictions have to
be interpreted with caution 3, two recent studies using very dif-
ferent paradigms—namely a visual distortion paradigm and an
3A deficit of motor predictive mechanisms in schizophrenia is often inferred
from studies that observe abnormal sensory attenuation and intentional bind-
ing in these patients. However, it has been argued that the contrasts used
by these studies appear to differ in a number of processes other than motor
prediction, such as temporal prediction and temporal control (Hughes et al.,
2013). Also many other studies commonly taken as support for the notion of
prediction deficits in schizophrenia patients with delusions of control can, in
fact, not directly explain delusions of control (Synofzik et al., 2008a,b, 2010).
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intentional binding paradigm—provide complementary evidence
that schizophrenia patients might indeed show imprecise inter-
nal predictions about the sensory consequences of their own
actions (Synofzik et al., 2010; Voss et al., 2010). Both studies
also showed that this deficit correlated with the severity of the
psychopathology: the higher the imprecision in predicting the
sensory consequences of one’s own actions, the higher the score
for delusions of influence (Synofzik et al., 2010). Similar results
using an intentional binding paradigm were found for patients in
a putative psychotic prodromal stage, suggesting a disturbance of
agency already early in the course of the disease (Hauser et al.,
2011a). Following the optimal cue integration approach, impre-
cise predictions should prompt the perceptual system to rely
more strongly on post-hoc cues in order to receive a more reli-
able account of one’s own actions. And indeed, the study by
Synofzik and colleagues found that schizophrenia patients relied
more on post-hoc information about their actions (in the study:
vision) (Synofzik et al., 2010). Similarly, another study investi-
gating schizophrenia patients, as well a group of patients with a
putative psychotic prodrome, showed that both patient groups,
compared to healthy individuals, relied more strongly on external
additional sensorimotor cues to agency in an ambiguous situa-
tion, where the reproduction of a drum-pad sequence had to be
judged with respect to self-agency (Hauser et al., 2011b).
The approach of optimal cue integration might thus provide
a common basis for the various misattributions of agency in
schizophrenia patients, including their episodic nature (Synofzik
and Voss, 2010; Synofzik et al., 2010). In schizophrenic patients
with delusions of influence, internal predictions about the sensory
consequences of one’s own actions could be frequently impre-
cise and non-reliable. Patients should therefore be prompted in
certain situations to rely more on (seemingly more reliable) alter-
native cues about self-action. These might either be post-hoc
(e.g., vision, auditory input, affective valence of the action out-
come, or postdictive thoughts), or predictive (e.g., prior sensori-
motor expectations based on specific background beliefs or prior
emotional appraisal of the situation). The stronger weighting of
these alternative cues could help patients to avoid misattribu-
tion of agency for self-produced sensory events in the case of
imprecise internal action-related predictions. However, as a con-
sequence of giving up the usuallymost robust and reliable internal
action information source, i.e., internal predictions, the sense of
agency in psychotic patients is at constant risk of being misled
by ad-hoc events, invading beliefs, and confusing emotions and
evaluations. In other words: schizophrenia patients would be at
constant risk of becoming “a slave to every environmental influ-
ence” (Frith, 1994, p. 151)—and to every affective and moral
ad-hoc evaluation. Different agency judgement errors may result:
patients might over-attribute external events to their own agency
whenever these more strongly weighted alternative agency cues
are not veridical and misleading, as is the case in delusions of
reference (also referred to as “megalomania”). Conversely, if alter-
native cues are temporarily not attended or unavailable, patients
might fail to attribute self-produced sensory events to their own
agency and instead assume external causal forces (as is the case
in delusions of influence). A context-dependent weighted inte-
gration of imprecise internal predictions and alternative agency
cues may therefore reflect the basis of agency attribution errors
in both directions: over-attribution, as in delusions of refer-
ence/megalomania, and under-attribution, as in delusions of
influence (Synofzik and Voss, 2010; Synofzik et al., 2010).
Agency attribution in patients with delusions of influence usu-
ally has a very specific semantic content, differing from individual
to individual (e.g., a delusional attribution of an action to a
particular neighbor, relative, or religious entity), and fails only
episodically and only in certain contexts. The cue integration
approach might also explain these features: (1) an imprecision
in efferent action-related information leads generally to a fluc-
tuating, unreliable basis on which the sense of agency is built,
prompting schizophrenia patients to rely more on other alterna-
tive cues, which might be misleading in some situations. (2) An
altered weighting of affective cues and the well-established dis-
turbances in formal thinking4 in schizophrenia will then lead to
an unbalanced and disturbed integration of different agency cues
with a lack of coherency and consistency. (3) This leads to the
formation of a delusional belief, resulting from an individual’s
weighting of cognitive and affective cues in a particular situation
and the individual’s personal background beliefs and history.
This would also explain why delusions of control domostly not
refer to trivial, non-emotional actions in daily life (e.g., brush-
ing teeth or typing on a computer), but mainly to very specific,
singular actions with high affective and/or moral value. Mostly,
they refer to actions that are morally and socially not acceptable
or at least negatively connoted, e.g., causing an accident, hurt-
ing someone, or behaving inappropriate in the presence of one’s
peers. Here the affective and moral valence gains major influence
on both the sensorimotor and the cognitive level (which might
lead to modulated predictions and perception as well as to spe-
cific negative beliefs), such that the action is consequently not
attributed to one’s own agency.
CONCLUSIONS
The registration of being the initiator of one’s own actions seems
to arise from a dynamic interplay between predictive cues and
postdictive cues. These can be in a sensorimotor format (e.g.,
internal predictions about the sensory consequences of one’s
actions or visual feedback) or in a cognitive format (e.g., back-
ground beliefs or information about the environment). The cues
are not mutually exclusive, but used in combination according
to their respective reliability to establish the most robust agency
representation in a given situation. The cues and the weight-
ing itself can be modulated by factors of the environment as
well as by affective factors (e.g., emotional appraisal or reward
anticipation).
4Features of formal thought deficits in schizophrenia patients which are
probably particularly relevant for the formation of delusional beliefs include
deficits in probabilistic reasoning and a premature “jumping to conclusions.”
Based on these deficits, patients might not give an adequate probabilistic
weight to each agency cue and reach conclusions on the basis of significantly
less evidence than healthy subjects and express more confidence in their deci-
sions (Fletcher and Frith, 2009). This might explain the clinical observation
that “patients all too easily develop false beliefs, which they then hold with
great confidence and immunity to any counter evidence” (Fletcher and Frith,
2009, p. 50).
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So far, only limited and preliminary experimental evidence
is available to support this novel framework of agency aware-
ness (Moore et al., 2009a; Synofzik et al., 2010; Hauser et al.,
2011b; Gentsch et al., 2012; Moore and Fletcher, 2012). Yet this
framework stimulates a wide range of questions and hypothe-
ses on agency processing in different subject groups that will be
experimentally testable:
1. In healthy subjects, which combination and which strength
of predictive or postdictive cues is necessary to override
internal predictions in installing (or rejecting) a sense of
agency?
2. Does optimal cue integration with respect to agency really
occur by a relative continuous shifting of weights along a
gradual scale, or are there threshold effects?
3. Are post-hoc cues (like e.g., visual feedback) similarly
weighted like predictive cues (e.g., primes)? Or is there a gen-
eral bias toward a stronger weighting of one of these types of
cues?
4. How do certain background conditions modulate the
weighting of each cue? For example, do conditions like e.g.,
stress, emotional arousal, or social distress lead to a stronger
weighting of postdictive cues?
5. Is there a general difference between how cues are integrated
on the level of feeling vs. the level of judgement of agency?
6. In schizophrenia patients, do imprecise predictions lead to
a similar over-reliance on predictive cues (like e.g., primes)
as on post-hoc cues (like e.g., visual feedback), or receive
postdictive cues generally a stronger weight?
7. Are schizophrenia patients particularly prone to modula-
tions of the weighting by affective factors? Or do they just
show a greater reliance on post-hoc cues?
8. Do neurological patients with e.g., cerebellar or parietal
lesions also show imprecise internal predictions about the
sensory consequences of their actions? If yes, can a differ-
ence in their cue integration explain why they do not also
show delusions of agency (like schizophrenia patients)? For
example, are they less prone to over-rely on post-hoc cues? Or
is it simply the lack of formal thought disorder, which pre-
serves their cue integration process and thus their sense of
agency?
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